Drafting and executing a document after an event occurs, but in a manner that accurately reflects the date on which the event transpired, is a permissible form of backdating.This is backdating that memorializes, something the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has recognized as a legitimate practice.The circuit court granted summary judgment to Allstate and an appeals court affirmed.The appeals court ruled that Shugarts “was required to provide Allstate with proof of his UIM claim as soon as possible after the incident giving rise to the claim.” But in , 2018 WI 27 (April 5, 2018), the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed concluding that “the operative event triggering the notice requirement in the Shugarts’ UIM policy is the tender of the tortfeasor’s underlying policy limit.” That is, Shugarts met the notice requirements established in the UIM policy with Allstate and a state statute that requires notice of proof of loss within one year after the time it was required by the policy did not apply to the UIM policy provision at issue.Allstate raised an affirmative defense untimeliness: no coverage was available, Allstate argued, because Shugarts failed to provide timely notice of his intention to make a claim.Allstate, a motion for summary judgment, argued that Shugarts failed to timely notify Allstate of the accident, which had occurred almost five years earlier in 2010.
“Giving effect to the exhaustion clause, we therefore conclude that the operative event triggering the notice requirement in the Shugarts’ UIM policy is the tender of the tortfeasor’s underlying policy limit,” Justice A. The supreme court disagreed because the policy language required “notice of claim,” not possible claim.
Furthermore, giving the written contract its own date simply reflects the reality of how the contract process unfolded, and it’s always good to have contracts track reality.
If the date of the oral agreement was reached is somehow significant, then mention it in the recitals of the written contract.
Yet, little has changed in our state laws to reflect this shift in our agricultural landscape. For example, a rural resident accepts the risk of non-redress when moving near a farm with 100 head of cattle, even if the operation expands to thousands of cattle and operates at a scale that requires state water pollution and other permits.
The second factor, which “un-shields” an agricultural use or practice from nuisance liability if it presents a substantial threat to public health or welfare, was intended in part to “avoid the possibility of a court finding that the statute is an unconstitutional taking of private property without compensation.” Wisconsin’s Legislature was responding to an Iowa Supreme Court case that “invalidated the Iowa right-to-farm statute on the grounds that it did not allow the court to find even the most offensive and unreasonable agricultural activity to be a nuisance.” These limitations expanded the common law “coming to the nuisance” doctrine, and further deterred nuisance actions against agricultural users by adding a one-way fee shifting provision.